



# HC3: Analyst Note

## December 12, 2022 TLP:CLEAR Report: 202212121500

### **BlackCat (AKA ALPHV)**

#### **Executive Summary**

BlackCat is a relatively new ransomware variant, known to be in operation since November 2021. It is exceptionally capable and is believed to be operated by individuals with significant experience as cyber criminals, who have extensive relationships with other significant players throughout the cybercriminal ecosystem. BlackCat is known to have targeted the healthcare and public health (HPH) sector and is expected to continue. The HPH should take this threat seriously and apply appropriate defensive and mitigative actions towards protecting their infrastructure from compromise.

#### **Report**

BlackCat (also known as Noberus or ALPHV) is a ransomware variant offered as part of [one of the most sophisticated Ransomware-as-a-service \(RaaS\) operations in the global cybercriminal ecosystem](#). BlackCat has been used in operations since November 2021. They are believed to be a successor to the [REvil](#), [Darkside](#) and [BlackMatter](#) operators and have [connections to FIN7 AKA Carbon Spider](#) as well as [FIN12](#). BlackCat is noteworthy because its features make it technically sophisticated as compared to other RaaS variants, allowing for the ability to target a wide range of corporate environments. BlackCat was one of the first major ransomware variants to be developed in the rust programming language, has a highly-customizable feature set, and relies heavily on internally-developed capabilities, which are constantly developed and have upgrades. The many advanced technical features include being entirely command-line driven, human-operated and adaptable malware which has the ability to use several different encryption routines, self-propagate, and render hypervisors ineffective to frustrate analysis. This has made BlackCat one of the more adaptable ransomware operations in the world.

Like all ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operations, the BlackCat operators recruit affiliates to perform corporate breaches and encrypt devices, while retaining code maintenance and development responsibilities for themselves. As previously noted, their ransomware code is highly customizable, and the executable includes [a JSON configuration](#) that allows that customization. This includes extensions, ransom note details, encryption, services targeted for termination and whitelisted folders/files/extensions.

#### **Encryption**

According to their own RaaS advertisements, BlackCat ransomware can be configured to use several different encryption modes:

- [Full file encryption](#) – the strongest but slowest encryption method.
- [Fast encryption](#) – the opposite of full – sacrifices strength for speed as it only encrypts the first N megabytes.
- [DotPattern encryption](#) – favors speed but is still somewhat strong encryption by encrypting N megabytes through M step.
- [SmartPattern encryption](#) – the most optimal mode in terms of speed/strength ratio; encrypts N megabytes in percentage steps (default: 10 megabytes every 10% of the file starting from the header).
  - Auto – The encryption speed/strength can change depending on the type and size of the file, the choice will be optimized for both speed and security.



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BlackCat has two encryption algorithms – [ChaCha20](#) and [AES](#). In auto mode (see above), it will default to AES unless there is no support for it in the local processor, in which case the malware encrypts files with ChaCha20.

### Functionality Summary

Some of BlackCat's primary functions can be seen in its command line parameters (Figure 1). Further details and explanation of its command line parameters can be found in Appendix B.

```
Administrator: Administrator Command Prompt
C:\Users\ \Desktop>malware.exe --help

USAGE:
[OPTIONS] [SUBCOMMAND]

OPTIONS:
--access-token <ACCESS_TOKEN>           Access Token
--bypass <BYPASS>...                     Invoked with drag and drop
--child                                   Run as child process
--drag-and-drop                           Drop drag and drop target batch file
--drop-drag-and-drop-target               Log more to console
--extra-verbose                           Print help information
-h, --help                                Enable logging to specified file
--log-file <LOG_FILE>                   Do not discover network shares on windows
--no-net                                  Do not self propagate(worm) on Windows
--no-prop                                 Do not propagate to defined servers
--no-prop-servers <NO_PROP_SERVERS>...   Do not stop VMs on ESXi
--no-vm-kill                              Do not stop defined VMs on ESXi
--no-vm-kill-names <NO_VM_KILL_NAMES>... Do not wipe VMs snapshots on ESXi
--no-vm-snapshot-kill                    Do not update desktop wallpaper on windows
--no-wall                                 Only process files inside defined paths
-p, --paths <PATHS>...                   Run as propagated process
--propagated                              Show user interface
--ui                                       Log to console
-v, --verbose
```

Figure 1: Command prompt view of BlackCat shows some of its capabilities (Image courtesy of [SecurityScorecard](#))

BlackCat can be configured with domain credentials to distribute its ransomware.

- The executable will extract PSEXec (Sysinternals) to the %Temp% folder and use it to distribute and execute the encryptor to remote Windows machines

BlackCat can terminate processes and Windows services that can protect against encryption. This includes but is not limited to:

- Shadow copies
- Commercial backup software
- Microsoft Exchange
- Database servers
- Microsoft Office Applications

BlackCat can also clear the Recycle Bit, connect to a Microsoft cluster and scan for network devices. It also uses the Windows Restart Manager API to close processes or shut down Windows services keeping a file open during encryption.



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Some victims have had unique Tor sites for negotiations and data leaks. BlackCat uses the following Tor site: [https://alphvmmm27o3abo3r2mlmjrpdmzle3rykajqc5xsj7j7ejksbpsa36ad.onion\[.\]ly](https://alphvmmm27o3abo3r2mlmjrpdmzle3rykajqc5xsj7j7ejksbpsa36ad.onion[.]ly)

BlackCat uses a tool called Exmatter for data exfiltration. Some of Exmatter’s details can be found [here](#). It also received some significant updates in August of 2022, the details of which can be found [here](#).

Since that update, it limits the type of exfiltrated files to: PDF, DOC, DOCX, XLS, PNG, JPG, JPEG, TXT, BMP, RDP, SQL, MSG, PST, ZIP, RTF, IPT, and DWG.

Exmatter also possesses the ability to create a report for exfiltrated files as well as corrupt them. Additionally, it has a self-destruct option if deployed and executed to a non-valid environment.

## Targeting

It is believed that BlackCat is capable of targeting the following operating systems:

- Windows, from 7 to 11, as well as Server 2008r2, 2012, 2016, 2019, 2022 (XP and 2003 can be encrypted over Server Message Block)
- ESXI (at least versions 5.5, 6.5, 7.0.2u)
- Debian (at least versions 7,8 and 9)
- Ubuntu (at least versions 18.04 and 20.04)
- ReadyNAS
- Synology




Figure 2: Geographic distribution of a sample of BlackCat targeting (Chart courtesy of [Group-IB](#))

BlackCat has been known to target pharmaceutical companies as well as pharmaceutical manufacturers, as well as several other non-healthcare enterprises.

## Analyst Comment

There are a number of recommendations for protecting against and mitigating impact from a BlackCat attack. First, HC3 continues to see the following four categories of attack vectors frequently associated with ransomware operators:

- Phishing
- Compromise of known vulnerabilities
- Compromise of remote-access technologies, especially VPNs and RDP
- Distributed attacks, especially supply chain and Managed Service Provider compromise

The FBI has provided mitigations, which include:

- Regularly back up data, air gap, and password protect backup copies offline. Ensure copies of critical data are not accessible for modification or deletion from the system where the data resides



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- Review antivirus logs for indications they were unexpectedly turned off
- Implement network segmentation
- Require administrator credentials to install software
- Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, secure location (e.g., hard drive, storage device, the cloud)
- Install updates/patch operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as updates/patches are released
- Use multifactor authentication where possible
- Disable unused remote access/Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) ports and monitor remote access/RDP logs
- Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls with leastn privilege in mind
- Install and regularly update antivirus and anti-malware software on all hosts

FBI's full list of mitigations can be found [here](#). If you are compromised by ransomware, the FBI advises you contact your local FBI field office, which can be found [here](#). Ransomware mitigation recommendations from the Department of Homeland Security can be found [here](#).

Samples of indicators of compromise and Yara rules can be found below.

### IOCs:

- <https://securityscorecard.com/research/deep-dive-into-alphv-blackcat-ransomware>
- <https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/62960d2bab11f2124cb4962e>
- <https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2022/220420.pdf>

### Yara Rules:

- <https://www.advintel.io/post/blackcat-in-a-shifting-threat-landscape-it-helps-to-land-on-your-feet-tech-dive>

### References

BlackCat – In a Shifting Threat Landscape, It Helps to Land on Your Feet: Tech Dive

<https://www.advintel.io/post/blackcat-in-a-shifting-threat-landscape-it-helps-to-land-on-your-feet-tech-dive>

Fat Cats: An analysis of the BlackCat ransomware affiliate program

<https://blog.group-ib.com/blackcat>

A Deep Dive Into ALPHV/BlackCat Ransomware

<https://securityscorecard.com/research/deep-dive-into-alphv-blackcat-ransomware>

BlackCat ransomware's data exfiltration tool gets an upgrade

<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackcat-ransomware-s-data-exfiltration-tool-gets-an-upgrade/>

Leading Ransomware Variants Q3 2022

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Noberus Ransomware: Darkside and BlackMatter Successor Continues to Evolve its Tactics

<https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/noberus-blackcat-ransomware-ttps>

Analyzing Exmatter: A Ransomware Data Exfiltration Tool

<https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/analyzing-exmatter-ransomware-data-exfiltration-tool>

Emotet botnet now pushes Quantum and BlackCat ransomware

<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/emotet-botnet-now-pushes-quantum-and-blackcat-ransomware/>

BlackCat ransomware claims attack on European gas pipeline

<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackcat-ransomware-claims-attack-on-european-gas-pipeline/>

BlackCat ransomware could be about to get a whole lot nastier

<https://www.techradar.com/news/blackcat-ransomware-could-be-about-to-get-a-whole-lot-nastier>

BlackCat Ransomware Group Deploys Brute Ratel Pen Testing Kit

<https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/blackcat-ransomware-group-pen-test/>

BlackCat ransomware attacks not merely a byproduct of bad luck

<https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/07/14/blackcat-ransomware-attacks-not-merely-a-byproduct-of-bad-luck/>

BlackCat (aka ALPHV) Ransomware is Increasing Stakes up to \$2.5M in Demands

<https://resecurity.com/blog/article/blackcat-aka-alphv-ransomware-is-increasing-stakes-up-to-25m-in-demands>

Ransomware gang creates site for employees to search for their stolen data #ALPHV #BlackCat

<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ransomware-gang-creates-site-for-employees-to-search-for-their-stolen-data/>

Prolific Ransomware Affiliate Groups Deploy BlackCat

<https://duo.com/decipher/prolific-affiliate-threat-groups-linked-to-blackcat-ransomware>

Microsoft: Exchange servers hacked to deploy BlackCat ransomware

<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-exchange-servers-hacked-to-deploy-blackcat-ransomware/>

The many lives of BlackCat ransomware

<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/06/13/the-many-lives-of-blackcat-ransomware/>





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BlackCat – In a Shifting Threat Landscape, It Helps to Land on Your Feet: Tech Dive

<https://www.advintel.io/post/blackcat-in-a-shifting-threat-landscape-it-helps-to-land-on-your-feet-tech-dive>

Novel BlackCat Ransomware Tactic Speeds Up Encryption Process

<https://duo.com/decipher/novel-blackcat-ransomware-tactic-speeds-up-encryption-process>

FBI: BlackCat ransomware breached at least 60 entities worldwide

<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/fbi-blackcat-ransomware-breached-at-least-60-entities-worldwide/>

FBI: BlackCat/ALPHV Ransomware Indicators of Compromise

<https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2022/220420.pdf>

An Investigation of the BlackCat Ransomware via Trend Micro Vision One

[https://www.trendmicro.com/en\\_us/research/22/d/an-investigation-of-the-blackcat-ransomware.html](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/d/an-investigation-of-the-blackcat-ransomware.html)

BlackCat Purveyor Shows Ransomware Operators Have 9 Lives

<https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/blackcat-purveyor-shows-ransomware-operators-have-nine-lives>

BlackCat Ransomware Targets Industrial Companies

<https://www.securityweek.com/blackcat-ransomware-targets-industrial-companies>

A Bad Luck BlackCat

<https://securelist.com/a-bad-luck-blackcat/106254/>

A look at the ransomware threat landscape. BlackMatter affiliate connected to BlackCat. EXOTIC LILY provides initial access for ransomware actors.

<https://thecyberwire.com/podcasts/research-briefing/109/notes>

From BlackMatter to BlackCat: Analyzing two attacks from one affiliate

<http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/from-blackmatter-to-blackcat-analyzing.html>

Cybereason vs. BlackCat Ransomware

<https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs.-blackcat-ransomware>

LockBit, BlackCat, Swissport, Oh My! Ransomware Activity Stays Strong

<https://threatpost.com/lockbit-blackcat-swissport-ransomware-activity/178261/>

BlackCat (ALPHV) ransomware linked to BlackMatter, DarkSide gangs

<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackcat-alphv-ransomware-linked-to-blackmatter-darkside-gangs/>

An ALPHV (BlackCat) representative discusses the group's plans for a ransomware 'meta-universe'

<https://therecord.media/an-alphv-blackcat-representative-discusses-the-groups-plans-for-a-ransomware-meta-universe/>



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Threat Assessment: BlackCat Ransomware

<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/blackcat-ransomware/>

Who Wrote the ALPHV/BlackCat Ransomware Strain?

<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2022/01/who-wrote-the-alphv-blackcat-ransomware-strain/>

Actor username01 (aka alphv, ransom) runs ALPHV aka ALPHV-ng, BlackCat ransomware-as-a-service affiliate program

<https://titan.intel471.com/report/inforep/aff92438c62c32c3a6a4835d7a62a94c>

Noberus: Technical Analysis Shows Sophistication of New Rust-based Ransomware

<https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/noberus-blackcat-alphv-rust-ransomware>

ALPHV BlackCat - This year's most sophisticated ransomware

<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/alphv-blackcat-this-years-most-sophisticated-ransomware/>

ALPHV (BlackCat) is the first professional ransomware gang to use Rust

<https://therecord.media/alphv-blackcat-is-the-first-professional-ransomware-gang-to-use-rust/>

Ransomware Group Debuts Searchable Victim Data

<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2022/06/ransomware-group-debuts-searchable-victim-data/>

## Appendix A: MITRE ATTACK MAPPING (Courtesy of Group-IB)

TACTIC	TECHNIQUE	DESCRIPTION
<b>TA0001 Initial Access</b>	T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application	In a number of attacks, the threat actors used ProxyShell vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207).
	T1133 External Remote Services	As an initial attack vector, insecure RDP and VPNs may be used.
	T1078 Valid Accounts	BlackCat affiliates may purchase access to their victim's network infrastructure on underground forums.
<b>TA0002 Execution</b>	T1106 Native API	BlackCat ransomware uses Native API.
	T1053 Scheduled Task/Job	When deploying ransomware in the victim's network infrastructure, BlackCat affiliates may exploit group policies, which results in a scheduled task being created (on each host) that launches the ransomware.
	T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell	The attackers may use PowerShell scripts when deploying ransomware in the victim's network, disabling security tools, and encrypting files.
	T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell	For stopping IIS, deleting Volume Shadow Copies, disabling recovery, clearing Windows event logs, etc., the BlackCat ransomware uses the command shell to run appropriate commands.
	T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation	The attackers may use wmic to obtain information and run various commands, including to delete Volume Shadow Copies. They may also use the wmiexec module from Impacket to execute commands and move across the network.
<b>TA0003 Persistence</b>	T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution	The BlackCat ransomware for Windows can self-propagate in the local area network using the legitimate PsExec utility (contained in its body), which creates a temporary system service.
	T1505 Server Software Component	Successfully exploiting ProxyShell vulnerabilities enabled the attackers to place a web shell on a vulnerable Microsoft Exchange server.
	T1078 Valid Accounts	Legitimate accounts obtained by the attackers can be used to ensure persistence in the compromised infrastructure.
<b>TA0004 Privilege Escalation</b>	T1078 Valid Accounts	To escalate privileges, BlackCat may use stolen legitimate accounts specified in the configuration data.
	T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account	To bypass UAC, BlackCat ransomware may escalate privileges using the ICMLuaUtil COM interface, as well as use the Masquerade PEB method.



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	Control	
	T1134.002 Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token	To escalate privileges, the BlackCat ransomware can launch its process using stolen authentication data and the function CreateProcessWithLogonW.
<b>TA0005 Defense Evasion</b>	T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control	The attackers may bypass UAC using the ICMLuaUtil COM interface, as well as use the Masquerade PEB method.
	T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	BlackCat decrypts configuration data as well as decrypts and unpacks the legitimate PsExec utility and an additional BAT file contained in the body of the ransomware.
	T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information	BlackCat ransomware uses obfuscation.
	T1562.001 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools	To prevent being detected, the attackers end processes and services related to security and antivirus software.
	T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	To counter analysis (including in a sandbox), ALPHV MORPH checks the value of the command line parameter access-token. Its value must contain correct first 16 characters used to decrypt BlackCat configuration data.
	T1070.001 Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Windows Event Logs	By using wevtutil, BlackCat can clear all Windows event logs on a compromised host.
	T1036 Masquerading	The attackers use a SoftPerfect Network Scanner executable renamed to svchost.exe.
	T1112 Modify Registry	To propagate, BlackCat uses PsExec to modify the system registry parameter MaxMpxCt to increase the number of failed network requests for each client.
<b>TA0006 Credential Access</b>	T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory	To obtain authentication data, the attackers may dump the LSASS process using legitimate tools (procdump, comsvcs.dll).
	T1552 Unsecured Credentials	To obtain authentication data from the registry and files, the attackers may use NirSoft utilities.
	T1555 Credentials from Password Stores	To extract authentication data from web browsers and other storage spaces the attackers may use NirSoft utilities.
<b>TA0007 Discovery</b>	T1018 Remote System Discovery	To enumerate domain hosts, the attackers used the ADRecon tool.
	T1069.002 Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups	To obtain information about local and domain user groups, the attackers used the ADRecon tool.
	T1069.002 Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups	
	T1069.002 Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups	
	T1087.001 Account Discovery: Local Account	To obtain information about local and domain accounts, the attackers used the ADRecon tool.
	T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account	
	T1482 Domain Trust Discovery	To obtain information about domain trust, the attackers used the ADRecon tool.
	T1046 Network Service Scanning	To scan the target network, the attackers use the open-source utility SoftPerfect Network Scanner.
	T1135 Network Share Discovery	To search for network shares, the attackers use the open-source utility SoftPerfect Network Scanner.
	T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery	For network reconnaissance, the attackers use the open-source utility SoftPerfect Network Scanner.
	T1082 System Information Discovery	BlackCat uses wmic to obtain the UUID of the compromised host.
	T1057 Process Discovery	BlackMatter enumerates all running processes to search for ones relating to security, backups, databases, email systems, office programs, etc.
	T1007 System Service Discovery	BlackCat enumerates system services to search for ones relating to security, backups, and databases.
	T1083 File and Directory Discovery	The attackers enumerate drives, directories, and files to search for sensitive information for exfiltration purposes.
<b>TA0008 Lateral Movement</b>	T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol	The attackers may use RDP to move across the network.
	T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares	After obtaining privileged authentication data, in order to spread over the local area network and access network resources, the attackers may use the PsExec utility, as well as the psexec, wmiexec and smbexec modules from Impacket.
	T1021.004 Remote Services: SSH	To access parts of the infrastructure running on Linux, the attackers use the PuTTY utility.
	T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer	Moving across the victim's network and deploying ransomware involves copying related tools to the host. The BlackCat ransomware can self-propagate in the network by using the legitimate PsExec utility contained in its body.
<b>TA0009 Collection</b>	T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility	Before being exfiltrated, data may be put in archives using 7-Zip.
	T1005 Data from Local System	The attackers collect information from the local system for exfiltration purposes.
	T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive	The attackers collect information from available network resources for exfiltration purposes.
	T1074 Data Staged	Before exfiltration, the attackers may put collected data in 7Zip archives.





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	T1119 Automated collection	The attackers use ExMatter, a tool for automated collection of sensitive information.
<b>TA0011 Command and Control</b>	T1071 Application Layer Protocol	Remote access tools used by the attackers may use application layer protocols (HTTP, HTTPS, DNS).
	T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer	After gaining initial access, the attackers copy tools necessary for deployment to the compromised host.
	T1572 Protocol Tunneling	To access the compromised system, the attackers may use tunnels built using ngrok or gost.
	T1573 Encrypted Channel	To remotely access the compromised infrastructure, the attackers may use Cobalt Strike, TeamViewer and ScreenConnect, which perform asymmetric/symmetric encryption of the C&C server communication channel.
	T1219 Remote Access Software	To remotely access the compromised infrastructure, the attackers may use the legitimate tools TeamViewer and ScreenConnect.
<b>TA0010 Exfiltration</b>	T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	When the attackers use Cobalt Strike, the collected information may be sent via Cobalt Strike server communication channels.
	T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	The attackers may use the ExMatter exfiltration tool, which sends stolen data to SFTP and WebDav resources specified in the ExMatter configuration.
	T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage	The attackers use the Rclone synchronization utility to upload stolen data to the legitimate cloud storage service MEGA.
	T1020 Automated Exfiltration	After access has been gained, files from target hosts are automatically uploaded to the legitimate cloud storage service MEGA using the Rclone utility.
	T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits	To prevent exceeding the size limits of the data being sent and triggering security controls, the stolen data may be sent in fixed-size blocks.
<b>TA0040 Impact</b>	T1486Data Encrypted for Impact	BlackCat encrypts the contents of files in the local system as well as on available network resources.
	T1489 Service Stop	BlackCat stops security, backup, database, email and other services specified in the configuration.
	T1490 Inhibit System Recovery	BlackCat deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin and wmic, disables recovery in the Windows boot menu using bccedit, and empties Recycle Bin. BlackCat can stop backup services. BlackCat can destroy virtual machine snapshots.
	T1485Data Destruction	If credentials for accessing a chat with the victim are leaked, BlackCat affiliates may delete encryption keys, which will render decrypting the files impossible.
	T1498 Network Denial of Service	If the victim refuses to pay a ransom, BlackCat may carry out DDoS attacks against the victim's infrastructure.

### Appendix B: Available Command-Line Parameters (Courtesy of Group-IB)

PARAMETER	DESCRIPTION
-h, --help	Displays information about command line parameters.
-p, --paths ...	Encrypts files at paths specified in this parameter.
-v, --verbose	Shows a report in the console.
--access-token	Specifies an access token (ACCESS_TOKEN). This is used to form an access key (ACCESS_KEY) that is used for creating a link for the victim to access their personal page. In the ALPHV MORPH versions, the first 16 characters of ACCESS_TOKEN are used as a key to decrypt (AES-128 CTR) the ransomware configuration data.
--bypass ...	This parameter is not used.
--child	Launches the ransomware as a child process.
--drag-and-drop	Launches the ransomware in drag-and-drop mode.
--drop-drag-and-drop-target	Extracts a BAT file, to which objects that are to be encrypted can be dragged in drag-and-drop mode. The template for the BAT file is in the body of the ransomware in a compressed format (Deflate). In the ALPHV MORPH versions the template is additionally encrypted (AES128 CTR).
--extra-verbose	Shows a more detailed report.
--log-file	Outputs a report to a specified file.
--no-net	Ensure that files on available network resources are not encrypted.



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--no-prop	Ensures that the ransomware does not self-propagate. For self-propagation, the PsExec utility is used together with credentials specified in the value of the configuration data parameter "credentials". The PsExec utility is in the body of the ransomware in a compressed format (Deflate). In ALPHV MORPH it is also encrypted (AES128 CTR).
--no-prop-servers ...	A list of servers excluded during self-propagation.
--no-vm-kill	Ensures that virtual machines are not stopped.
--no-vm-kill-names ...	A list of names of virtual machines that are not stopped.
--no-vm-snapshot-kill	Ensures that virtual machine snapshots are not destroyed.
--no-wall	Ensures that the desktop wallpaper is not updated.
--propagated	Launches the ransomware in self-propagation (worm) mode.
--ui	Launch the ransomware with a graphical interface displaying the encryption progress.

## Contact Information

If you have any additional questions, we encourage you to contact us at [HC3@hhs.gov](mailto:HC3@hhs.gov).

We want to know how satisfied you are with the resources HC3 provides. Your answers will be anonymous, and we will use the responses to improve all future updates, features, and distributions. [Share Your Feedback](#)