



LEADERSHIP FOR IT SECURITY & PRIVACY ACROSS HHS

HHS CYBERSECURITY PROGRAM

OFFICE OF INFORMATION SECURITY



Hive Ransomware

10/21/2021



- Hive Ransomware Overview
- Legitimate Applications and Closed Source Code
- Hive Ransomware Attacks
- Hive Ransomware Activity Targeting the U.S. HPH
- Hive Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)
- Mitigations

Slides Key:



Non-Technical: Managerial, strategic and high-level (general audience)



Technical: Tactical / IOCs; requiring in-depth knowledge (sysadmins, IRT)



- First observed in June 2021
- According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), it “likely operates as an affiliate-based ransomware”
- Double extortion ransomware
- Human-operated attacks
- Uses legitimate commercial applications
- Utilizes their own closed-source ransomware (compiled for both 32-bit and 64-bit machines)
- Possible Russian-speaking actors

Additional information can be found in the August 25, 2021 FBI report, *TLP: WHITE Flash Alert (MU-000150-MW) Indicators of Compromise Associated with Hive Ransomware*





Legitimate Commercial Applications Used by Hive

- Cobalt Strike
- ConnectWise
- ADrecon

Closed Source Code Hive Ransomware

- Written in Go programming language
- Compiled in UPX
- Windows specific





Initial Access

- Phishing Emails
- Remote Desktop Protocols

First Hive Actions

```
Windowssystem32cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe  
WindowsSystem32comsvcs.dll MinDump 752 lsass.dmp full
```

- Attempts to dump credentials

- Cache cleartext credential data

- ADrecon (legitimate commercial software) used to “map, traverse, and enumerate” the Active Directory (AD) environment

```
Windowssystem32cmd.exe /C reg add  
HKLMSYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlSecurityProvidersWDigest /v  
UseLogonCredential /t REG_DWORD /d 1 && gpupdate /force
```



Hive Payload Executes

- Terminates:
 - Computer backup and restore
 - Antivirus and antispyware
 - File copying
- Identifies and stops the following services:
 - Database (sql, oracle, postgres, redis)
 - Backup (bmr, vss)
 - Protocol (ssftp)
- Processes are terminated:
 - mspub and msdesktop
- “hive.bat” and “shadow.bat” → Encryption Process Begins
 - Excluding the C:\Windows” drive

```
"bmr | sql | oracle | postgres | redis | vss | backup | sstp"
```

```
hive.bat x
1 :Repeat
2 timeout 1 || sleep 1
3 del "C:\Users\Analyst\Desktop\hive\hive.exe"
4 if exist "C:\Users\Analyst\Desktop\hive\hive.exe" goto Repeat
5 del "hive.bat"
6
7
```

```
vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
del shadow.bat
```



Hive Portal

- Ransom note
- Unique credentials given to victim
- 2–6 days for payment; if not, data is leaked to HiveLeaks

```
HOW_TO_DECRYPT - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
Your network has been breached and all data were downloaded and encrypted.

To decrypt all the data or to prevent it from leakage at our website
and in mass media you will need to purchase our decryption software.
Please contact our sales department at:

http://hivecust6vhekztbqgdnkks64ucehqacge3dij3gyrrpdp57zoq3ooqd.onion/
Login: ghqDwAhWc3gk
Password: 7RPnn8JXMUCicADiL3ES

Follow the guidelines below to avoid losing your data:

- Do not shutdown or reboot your computers, unmount external storages.

- Do not try to decrypt data using third party software. It may cause
irreversible damage.


- Do not fool yourself. Encryption has perfect secrecy and it's impossible
to decrypt without knowing the key.

- Do not modify, rename or delete *.key.* + config.Extension + ` files.
Your data will be undecryptable.

- Do not modify or rename encrypted files. You will lose them.

- Do not report to authorities. The negotiation process will be terminated
immediately and the key will be erased.


- Do not reject to purchase. Your sensitive data will be publicly disclosed
at http://hiveleakdbtnp76ulyhi52eag6c6tyc3xw7ez7iqy6wc34gd2nekazyd.onion/
```



Hive Ransomware Activity Targeting the U.S. HPH



| HC3 Tracked Hive Ransomware Attacks on U.S. HPH Sector Since June 2021 | |
|--|------------------------------|
| Approximate Date of Attack Identification | Sub-Industry Targeted |
| 03AUG21 | Healthcare Industry Services |
| 15AUG21 | Hospital |
| 25AUG21 | Healthcare Industry Services |
| 29AUG21 | Health or Medical Clinic |
| 02OCT21 | Hospital |






Results of the attacks for patient services

- Canceled surgeries, diversion of ambulances, and closed urgent care units

Information Stolen

- 62–400 GB of information/data related to:
 - Medical records/care
 - Financial documents
 - Proprietary company work
 - Insurance forms, court documents
 - General work product, passwords
 - Employees' PII
 - Confidential clients' names





Hive MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

| Technique ID | Technique |
|--------------|--|
| T1574.001 | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking |
| TA0005 | Defense Evasion |
| TA0004 | Privilege Escalation |
| T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact |
| T1027.002 | Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing |
| T1003.001 | OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory |
| T1007 | System Service Discovery |
| T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter |
| T1059.001 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell |
| T1059.003 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell |
| T1490 | Inhibit System Recovery |





General efforts to help prevent ransomware attacks include:

- Maintain offline, encrypted backups of data and regularly test your backups.
- Create, maintain, and exercise a basic cyber incident response plan, resiliency plan, and associated communications plan.
- Mitigate internet-facing vulnerabilities and misconfigurations.
- Reduce the risk of phishing emails from reaching end users.
- Practice good cyber hygiene.

3-2-1 Backup Rule



CISA ransomware tips:

https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CISA_Fact_SheetProtecting_Sensitive_and_Personal_Information_from_Ransomware-Caused_Data_Breaches-508C.pdf

Specific Mitigations/Detections for Hive Ransomware

- Remove applications not deemed necessary for day-to-day operations
- Abnormal termination of the bmr, sql, oracle, postgres, redis, vss, backup, and sst services
- Abnormal termination of the mspub and msdesktop processes
- Log monitoring



Reference Materials



Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Flash Alert (MU-000150-MW) Indicators of Compromise Associated with Hive Ransomware,” Internet Crime Complaint Center. 25 August 2021.

<https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2021/210825.pdf>

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Walter, Jim. “Hive Attacks | Analysis of the Human-Operated Ransomware Targeting Healthcare,” Sentinel Labs. 23 August 2021. <https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hive-attacks-analysis-of-the-human-operated-ransomware-targeting-healthcare/>

The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team. “Threat Thursday: Bee-ware of Hive Ransomware,” BlackBerry. 22 July 2021. <https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2021/07/threat-thursday-hive-ransomware>

Kim, Christopher. “Hive Ransomware,” InfoBlox. 30 August 2021. <https://blogs.infoblox.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/cyber-threat-advisory/hive-ransomware/>

Health Sector Cybersecurity Coordination Center. “Health Sector Ransomware Trends for Third Quarter 2021,” HealthCare Intelligence. 13 October 2021.

https://www.intelligence.healthcare/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&download=282:hc3-analyst-note-health-sector-ransomware-trends-for-2021-q3&id=8:hccic-e-briefs&Itemid=1220&start=220



McKeon, Jill. "Hive Ransomware Continues to Attack Healthcare Providers," Health Security. 23 September 2021. <https://healthitsecurity.com/news/hive-ransomware-continues-to-attack-healthcare-providers>

Vaas, Lisa. "Cobalt Strike Usage Explodes Among Cybercrooks," ThreatPost. 29 June 2021. <https://threatpost.com/cobalt-strike-cybercrooks/167368/>





Questions



Upcoming Briefs

- 11/4 – Cobalt Strike vs the Health Sector

Product Evaluations

Recipients of this and other Healthcare Sector Cybersecurity Coordination Center (HC3) Threat Intelligence products are highly encouraged to provide feedback. If you wish to provide feedback, please complete the [HC3 Customer Feedback Survey](#).

Requests for Information

Need information on a specific cybersecurity topic? Send your request for information (RFI) to HC3@HHS.GOV.

Disclaimer

These recommendations are advisory and are not to be considered as Federal directives or standards. Representatives should review and apply the guidance based on their own requirements and discretion. HHS does not endorse any specific person, entity, product, service, or enterprise.



HC3 works with private and public sector partners to improve cybersecurity throughout the Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Sector

Products



Sector & Victim Notifications

Direct communications to victims or potential victims of compromises, vulnerable equipment or PII/PHI theft, as well as general notifications to the HPH about current impacting threats via the HHS OIG.



White Papers

Document that provides in-depth information on a cybersecurity topic to increase comprehensive situational awareness and provide risk recommendations to a wide audience.



Threat Briefings & Webinar

Briefing presentations that provide actionable information on health sector cybersecurity threats and mitigations. Analysts present current cybersecurity topics, engage in discussions with participants on current threats, and highlight best practices and mitigation tactics.

Need information on a specific cybersecurity topic, or want to join our Listserv? Send your request for information (RFI) to HC3@HHS.GOV, or visit us at www.HHS.Gov/HC3.



Contact



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