



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments¹

Date: September 21, 2021

The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing this updated advisory to highlight the sanctions risks associated with ransomware payments in connection with malicious cyber-enabled activities and the proactive steps companies can take to mitigate such risks, including actions that OFAC would consider to be "mitigating factors" in any related enforcement action.²

Demand for ransomware payments has increased during the COVID-19 pandemic as cyber actors target online systems that U.S. persons rely on to continue conducting business. Companies that facilitate ransomware payments to cyber actors on behalf of victims, including financial institutions, cyber insurance firms, and companies involved in digital forensics and incident response, not only encourage future ransomware payment demands but also may risk violating OFAC regulations. The U.S. government strongly discourages all private companies and citizens from paying ransom or extortion demands and recommends focusing on strengthening defensive and resilience measures to prevent and protect against ransomware attacks.

This advisory describes the potential sanctions risks associated with making and facilitating ransomware payments and provides information for contacting relevant U.S. government agencies, including OFAC if there is any reason to suspect the cyber actor demanding ransomware payment may be sanctioned or otherwise have a sanctions nexus.³

Background on Ransomware Attacks

Ransomware is a form of malicious software ("malware") designed to block access to a computer system or data, often by encrypting data or programs on information technology systems to extort ransom payments from victims in exchange for decrypting the information and restoring victims' access to their systems or data. In some cases, in addition to the attack, cyber actors threaten to publicly disclose victims' sensitive files. The cyber actors then demand a

¹ This advisory is explanatory only and does not have the force of law. It does not modify statutory authorities, Executive Orders, or regulations. It is not intended to be, nor should it be interpreted as, comprehensive, or as imposing requirements under U.S. law, or otherwise addressing any requirements under applicable law. Please see the legally binding provisions cited for relevant legal authorities.

² This advisory updates and supersedes OFAC's *Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments* of October 1, 2020.

³ This advisory is limited to sanctions risks related to ransomware and is not intended to address issues related to information security practitioners' cyber threat intelligence-gathering efforts more broadly. For guidance related to those activities, see guidance from the U.S. Department of Justice, *Legal Considerations when Gathering Online Cyber Threat Intelligence and Purchasing Data from Illicit Sources* (February 2020), available at <https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/page/file/1252341/download>.

ransomware payment, usually through virtual currency, in exchange for a key to decrypt the files and restore victims' access to systems or data.

In recent years, ransomware attacks have become more focused, sophisticated, costly, and numerous. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), there was a nearly 21 percent increase in reported ransomware cases and a 225 percent increase in associated losses from 2019 to 2020.⁴ Ransomware attacks are carried out against private and governmental entities of all sizes and in all sectors, including organizations operating critical infrastructure, such as hospitals. Often attacks also take place against vulnerable entities such as school districts and smaller businesses, in part due to the attacker's assumption that such victims may have fewer resources to invest in cyber protection and will make quick payment to restore services.

OFAC Designations of Malicious Cyber Actors

OFAC has designated numerous malicious cyber actors under its cyber-related sanctions program and other sanctions programs, including perpetrators of ransomware attacks and those who facilitate ransomware transactions. For example, starting in 2013, a ransomware variant known as Cryptolocker was used to infect more than 234,000 computers, approximately half of which were in the United States.⁵ OFAC designated the developer of Cryptolocker, Evgeniy Mikhailovich Bogachev, in December 2016.⁶

Starting in late 2015 and lasting approximately 34 months, SamSam ransomware was used to target mostly U.S. government institutions and companies, including the City of Atlanta, the Colorado Department of Transportation, and a large healthcare company. In November 2018, OFAC designated two Iranians for providing material support to a malicious cyber activity and identified two virtual currency addresses used to funnel SamSam ransomware proceeds.⁷

In May 2017, a ransomware known as WannaCry 2.0 infected approximately 300,000 computers in at least 150 countries. This attack was linked to the Lazarus Group, a cybercriminal organization sponsored by North Korea. OFAC designated the Lazarus Group and two sub-groups, Bluenoroff and Andariel, in September 2019.⁸

⁴ Compare Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center, *2019 Internet Crime Report*, available at https://pdf.ic3.gov/2019_IC3Report.pdf, with Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center, *2020 Internet Crime Report*, available at https://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/AnnualReport/2020_IC3Report.pdf.

⁵ Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, U.S. Leads Multi-National Action Against "Gameover Zeus" Botnet and "Cryptolocker" Ransomware, Charges Botnet Administrator (June 2, 2014), available at <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-leads-multi-national-action-against-gameover-zeus-botnet-and-cryptolocker-ransomware>.

⁶ Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Two Individuals for Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities (Dec. 29, 2016), available at <https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/j10693.aspx>.

⁷ Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Treasury Designates Iran-Based Financial Facilitators of Malicious Cyber Activity and for the First Time Identifies Associated Digital Currency Addresses (Nov. 28, 2018), available at <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm556>.

⁸ Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups (Sept. 13, 2019), available at <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm774>.

Beginning in 2015, Evil Corp, a Russia-based cybercriminal organization, used the Dridex malware to infect computers and harvest login credentials from hundreds of banks and financial institutions in over 40 countries, causing more than \$100 million in theft. In December 2019, OFAC designated Evil Corp and its leader, Maksim Yakubets, for their development and distribution of the Dridex malware.⁹

In September 2021, OFAC designated SUEX OTC, S.R.O. (“SUEX”), a virtual currency exchange, for its part in facilitating financial transactions for ransomware actors, involving illicit proceeds from at least eight ransomware variants. Analysis of known SUEX transactions showed that over 40% of SUEX’s known transaction history was associated with illicit actors.¹⁰

OFAC has imposed, and will continue to impose, sanctions on these actors and others who materially assist, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for these activities.¹¹

Ransomware Payments with a Sanctions Nexus Threaten U.S. National Security Interests

Facilitating a ransomware payment that is demanded as a result of malicious cyber activities may enable criminals and adversaries with a sanctions nexus to profit and advance their illicit aims. For example, ransomware payments made to sanctioned persons or to comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions could be used to fund activities adverse to the national security and foreign policy objectives of the United States. Such payments not only encourage and enrich malicious actors, but also perpetuate and incentivize additional attacks. Moreover, there is no guarantee that companies will regain access to their data or be free from further attacks themselves. For these reasons, the U.S. government strongly discourages the payment of cyber ransom or extortion demands.

Facilitating Ransomware Payments on Behalf of a Victim May Violate OFAC Regulations

Under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) or the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA),¹² U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions, directly or indirectly, with individuals or entities (“persons”) on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), other blocked persons, and those covered by comprehensive country or region embargoes (e.g., Cuba, the Crimea region of

⁹ Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Evil Corp, the Russia-Based Cybercriminal Group Behind Dridex Malware (Dec. 5, 2019), available at <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm845>.

¹⁰ Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Treasury Takes Robust Actions to Counter Ransomware (Sept. 21, 2021), available at <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0364>.

¹¹ Federal charges have also been brought in connection with each of the aforementioned ransomware schemes. *See*, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Russian National Charged with Decade-Long Series of Hacking and Bank Fraud Offenses Resulting in Tens of Millions in Losses and Second Russian National Charged with Involvement in Deployment of “Bugat” Malware (Dec. 5, 2019), available at <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/russian-national-charged-decade-long-series-hacking-and-bank-fraud-offenses-resulting-tens>; and Press Release U.S. Dept. of Justice, Three North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyberattacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe (Feb. 17, 2021), available at <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-north-korean-military-hackers-indicted-wide-ranging-scheme-commit-cyberattacks-and#:~:text=A%20federal%20indictment%20unsealed%20today,and%20companies%2C%20to%20create%20>.

¹² 50 U.S.C. §§ 4301–41; 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–06.

Ukraine, Iran, North Korea, and Syria). Additionally, any transaction that causes a violation under IEEPA, including a transaction by a non-U.S. person that causes a U.S. person to violate any IEEPA-based sanctions prohibitions, is also prohibited. U.S. persons, wherever located, are also generally prohibited from facilitating actions of non-U.S. persons that could not be directly performed by U.S. persons due to U.S. sanctions regulations.

OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations based on strict liability, meaning that a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction may be held civilly liable even if such person did not know or have reason to know that it was engaging in a transaction that was prohibited under sanctions laws and regulations administered by OFAC. OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines (Enforcement Guidelines)¹³ provide more information regarding OFAC's enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions, including the factors that OFAC generally considers when determining an appropriate response to an apparent violation. Enforcement responses range from non-public responses, including issuing a No Action Letter or a Cautionary Letter, to public responses, such as civil monetary penalties.

Sanctions Compliance Program and Defensive/Resilience Measures

Under OFAC's Enforcement Guidelines, the existence, nature, and adequacy of a sanctions compliance program is a factor that OFAC may consider when determining an appropriate enforcement response to an apparent violation of U.S. sanctions laws or regulations.

As a general matter, OFAC encourages financial institutions and other companies to implement a risk-based compliance program to mitigate exposure to sanctions-related violations.¹⁴ This also applies to companies that engage with victims of ransomware attacks, such as those involved in providing cyber insurance, digital forensics and incident response, and financial services that may involve processing ransom payments (including depository institutions and money services businesses). In particular, the sanctions compliance programs of these companies should account for the risk that a ransomware payment may involve an SDN or blocked person, or a comprehensively embargoed jurisdiction. Companies involved in facilitating ransomware payments on behalf of victims should also consider whether they have regulatory obligations under Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) regulations.¹⁵

Meaningful steps taken to reduce the risk of extortion by a sanctioned actor through adopting or improving cybersecurity practices, such as those highlighted in the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) [September 2020 Ransomware Guide](#),¹⁶ will be

¹³ 31 C.F.R. part 501, appx. A.

¹⁴ To assist the public in developing an effective sanctions compliance program, in 2019, OFAC published *A Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments*, intended to provide organizations with a framework for the five essential components of a risk-based sanctions compliance program. The *Framework* is available at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/framework_ofac_cc.pdf.

¹⁵ See FinCEN Guidance, FIN-2020-A006, *Advisory on Ransomware and the Use of the Financial System to Facilitate Ransom Payments*, October 1, 2020, for applicable anti-money laundering obligations related to financial institutions in the ransomware context.

¹⁶ See Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Guidance, *Ransomware Guide*, September 2020, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CISA_MS-ISAC_Ransomware%20Guide_S508C_.pdf.

considered a significant mitigating factor in any OFAC enforcement response.¹⁷ Such steps could include maintaining offline backups of data, developing incident response plans, instituting cybersecurity training, regularly updating antivirus and anti-malware software, and employing authentication protocols, among others.

Cooperation with OFAC and Law Enforcement

Another factor that OFAC will consider under the Enforcement Guidelines is the reporting of ransomware attacks to appropriate U.S. government agencies and the nature and extent of a subject person's cooperation with OFAC, law enforcement, and other relevant agencies, including whether an apparent violation of U.S. sanctions is voluntarily self-disclosed. In the case of ransomware payments that may have a sanctions nexus, OFAC will consider a company's self-initiated and complete report of a ransomware attack to law enforcement or other relevant U.S. government agencies, such as CISA or the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection (OCCIP), made as soon as possible after discovery of an attack, to be a voluntary self-disclosure and a significant mitigating factor in determining an appropriate enforcement response. OFAC will also consider a company's full and ongoing cooperation with law enforcement both during and after a ransomware attack — e.g., providing all relevant information such as technical details, ransom payment demand, and ransom payment instructions as soon as possible — to be a significant mitigating factor.

While the resolution of each potential enforcement matter depends on the specific facts and circumstances, OFAC would be more likely to resolve apparent violations involving ransomware attacks with a non-public response (i.e., a No Action Letter or a Cautionary Letter) when the affected party took the mitigating steps described above, particularly reporting the ransomware attack to law enforcement as soon as possible and providing ongoing cooperation.

OFAC Licensing Policy

Ransomware payments benefit illicit actors and can undermine the national security and foreign policy objectives of the United States. For this reason, license applications involving ransomware payments demanded as a result of malicious cyber-enabled activities will continue to be reviewed by OFAC on a case-by-case basis with a presumption of denial.

Victims of Ransomware Attacks Should Contact Relevant Government Agencies

OFAC strongly encourages all victims and those involved with addressing ransomware attacks to report the incident to CISA, their local FBI field office, the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center, or their local U.S. Secret Service office as soon as possible. Victims should also report ransomware attacks and payments to Treasury's OCCIP and contact OFAC if there is any reason to suspect a potential sanctions nexus with regard to a ransomware payment. As noted, in doing so victims can receive significant mitigation from OFAC when determining an appropriate enforcement response in the event a sanctions nexus is found in connection with a ransomware payment.

¹⁷ See the U.S. government's website, <https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware>, for additional guidance.

By reporting ransomware attacks as soon as possible, victims may also increase the likelihood of recovering access to their data through other means, such as alternative decryption tools, and in some circumstances may be able to recover some of the ransomware payment. Additionally, reporting ransomware attacks and payments provides critical information needed to track cyber actors, hold them accountable, and prevent or disrupt future attacks.

Contact Information for U.S. Department of Treasury Agencies:

- U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
 - Sanctions Compliance and Evaluation Division: ofac_feedback@treasury.gov; (202) 622-2490 / (800) 540-6322
 - Licensing Division: <https://licensing.ofac.treas.gov/>; (202) 622-2480
- U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection (OCCIP)
 - OCCIP-Coord@treasury.gov; (202) 622-3000
- U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)
 - FinCEN Regulatory Support Section: frc@fincen.gov

Contact Information for Other Relevant U.S. Government Agencies:

- Federal Bureau of Investigation Cyber Task Force
 - <https://www.ic3.gov/default.aspx>; www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field
- U.S. Secret Service Cyber Fraud Task Force
 - <https://secretservice.gov/contact/field-offices>
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
 - <https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/report>
- Homeland Security Investigations Field Office
 - <https://www.ice.gov/contact/hsi>

Ransomware Prevention Resources:

- U.S. Government StopRansomWare.gov Website
 - <https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware>
- CISA Ransomware Guide
 - <https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide>

If you have any questions regarding the scope of any sanctions requirements described in this advisory, please contact OFAC’s Sanctions Compliance and Evaluation Division at (800) 540-6322 or (202) 622-2490.